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The purpose of ‘behavioural education economics’ is to understand the psychological factors 
influencing educational choice and how individuals optimise these investments within a 
cognitively hard and complex decision space. Underlying behavioural education economics is 
the understanding that educational decision making is characterised by choices which are usually 
not repeated and rely heavily on heuristics to solve complex decisions in the absence of prior 
learning. By understanding the decision architecture underlying choices in education, causal 
mechanisms can be identified to guide policy interventions to improve academic outcomes which 
ultimately influence earnings and other life outcomes such as health. Given that individuals 
deploy heuristic based decision strategies to arrive at a ‘good’ outcome in the face of incomplete 
information and limited time (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), it is important to understand the 
cognitive processes underlying these strategies and the impact of behavioural biases (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974) which lead to unintended social and economic outcomes. Behavioural biases 
that can effect educational decisions include anchoring, framing, loss aversion, the availability 
heuristic and prospect theory. Behavioural education economics matters because for the last 30 
years rational choice theory based education policy has failed to generate the expected economic 
outcomes, delivering only marginal overall benefits at best. 
Choices in education are complex. Complexity arises from incomplete information, path 
dependency and the irreversibility of most choices in education. Choices in education are 
infrequent and rarely repeated. Each stage of investment, such as early childhood or school, 
comes with its own set of unique opportunities and constraints. Unlike conventional markets, 
investments in education cannot be readily resold or returned1 and individuals usually do not 
benefit from delaying investments.2 A level of complexity that would challenge seasoned 
economists not subject to everyday time constraints. Faced with limited time to make decisions 
and the infrequency of these choices, individuals have little opportunity to optimise utility 
through repetitive refinement, Arrow’s (1962) ‘learning by doing’. 
The solution to decision making under complexity, limited time and few opportunities for 
learning is ‘bounded rationality’. Faced with the uniqueness and complexity of investments in 
their education, the decision making process individuals undertake operates within the 
framework of heuristics and biases. Simon (1959) showed that even complex choices under 
certainty are computationally hard to solve with decreasing marginal returns to computation. 
This leads to satisficing behaviour where the heuristic ‘close enough is good enough’ is applied 
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for choices which have an acceptability threshold: ‘‘Models of satisficing behaviour are richer 
than models of maximising behaviour, because they treat not only of equilibrium but of the 
method of reaching it as well’’ (Simon 1959). Under uncertainty, conditions of low information 
availability require decision making to rely on a variety of time efficient heuristics to match the 
complexity and type of choice context. These maybe general purpose intuitive heuristics that 
involve making interferences under uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), framing 
heuristics to reduce decision space complexity (Thaler, 1985), or ‘fast and frugal’ decision 
heuristics (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) which reduce the complexity of rules applied. 
The history of education economics has its foundation in Becker’s (1964) seminal work on 
human capital where individuals, parents and students, are required to make a series of complex 
inter-generational and intertemporal choices to maximise their utility over time. Education 
economicshastraditionallyfocusedontheimpactcognitiveability,wealthconstraints,qualityofteachi
ng resources and family size have on choices (Becker & Tomes, 1976), the economic returns to 
investments in education (Mincer, 1958), non-market returns to education (Grossman 2006), how 
markets in education should lead to improvements in education quality (Friedman, 1955), how 
choices in education can be optimised through community sorting (Tiebout, 1956), and how 
educational preferences associated with school choice are revealed through house prices (Black, 
1999). The most important precursor to behavioural education economics are the econometric 
studies of the impact of educational vouchers (Epple & Romano, 1998) and socio-economic 
stratification of education (Archibald, 2000) indicating that there are factors rational choice 
theory is unable in its present form to account for. These studies indicate for example, that 
contrary to rational choice predictions low socio-economic families fail to exercise choice and 
consequentially lag in educational outcomes despite the intervention of economic policies. To 
understand why policies have failed at the macro-level, focus has turned the mechanics of 
individual choice associated with investments in education. In a national US study of how 
students respond to different types of financing in their decisions to study and complete college 
Avery and Hoxby (2004) found that ‘‘a third of the students are probably under investing and 
our conservative calculations suggest that a typical mistake is worth$76,096 in present value’’. 
In particular, Avery and Hoxby found evidence of present bias in student’s preferences for front-
loaded3 financial aid and positional framing in their preference for aid presented as scholarships 
as opposed to aid as grants. 
While behavioural education economics is relatively new, its lineage dates back to Rosenthal 
and Jacobson’s seminal 1968 paper on the Pygmalion Effect4 in the classroom, Mischel et al.’s 
(1972) use of the ‘marshmallow test’ to investigate self-control in children and Kagan et al.’s 
(1958) research into how personality influences changes in cognitive ability over time. 
Consequently, the focus of education economics has turned to the role of non-cognitive 
behaviours have on choices in education and subsequent labour market outcomes. ‘‘Non-
cognitive skills strongly influence schooling decisions, and also affect wages given schooling 
decisions’’ (Heckman et al., 2006). For a deeper discussion of why non-cognitive skills matter 
see Heckman and Kautz (2012) and for their long term effects see Fredriksson et al. (2011). 
At the heart of behavioural education economics is an understanding that academic outcomes 
are malleable. That investment decisions associated with education are primarily driven by non-
cognitive behaviours and cognitive biases that affect participation in education, and subsequently 
motivations to commit resources to these investments and maintain these choices over time. This 
is contrary to the more deterministic view of neoclassical economics where genetic and wealth 
inherence plays the primary roles in an individual’s choices leading to academic and earnings 
outcomes (see Becker, 1976). Instead for behavioural education economics cognitive ability 
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affects the speed of learning but not the ultimate capacity of learning. Consequently, educational 
outcomes reflect Marcus’ (2009) position that while genes pre-wire the brain, the brain is only 
pre-organised and remains malleable to experience (for instance synaptic pruning during 
adolescence). 
Education is by its very nature is a social process where social interactions shape both the 
willingness of individuals to invest in education and the returns from these investments. Humans 
are not merely efficient maximisers of self-interest but highly social animals that require new 
cognitive processes to handle the complexity of social interactions. Importantly, social cognitive 
processes are key to learning. Regions of the brain associated with social cognition have been 
shown to have evolved relatively recently in humans compared our closest evolutionary cousins, 
the great apes (Tomasello, 2014). Social interactions, however, give rise to the fundamental 
economic problem of asymmetric information where we do not automatically have complete 
information as to the motivations and preferences of others. Our most recent cognitive machinery 
most likely represents an attempt to minimise these information constraints. However, the 
complexity of our social interactions is now accelerating over a relatively short period of 
evolutionary time. Automatic cognitive processes such as the general inference heuristics may 
not only be inappropriate for decision making in educational contexts but also very costly. Small 
initial errors arising from cognitive biases, such as teacher prejudice (e.g. Pygmalion effect) or 
peer stereotyping, can compound over time leading to significant student achievement gaps. 
Consequently, understanding the impact different cognitive processes have on the decision 
architecture linked to investments in education is crucial for the development of effective policy 
solutions. 
Behavioural economics is generally viewed through the lens of how cognitive biases and 
heuristics can lead to errors and consequently sub-optimal choice decisions. However, choices 
in education are unique to the extent to which cognitive biases and heuristics have the capacity 
to shape preferences. Drawing on McFadden’s (2001) choice process model (modified version 
Figure 26.1), the key insight of behavioural education economics is that social interactions 
inform ‘perceptions and beliefs’ which via their impact on motivations and attitudes shape 
economic preferences. Critically, social positioning provides a reference point for asymmetric 
valuations and behaviour linked to loss aversion. This leads to the implication that preferences 
linked to choices in education appear to be endogenous.5 Where underlying innate preferences 
‘switch’ in a manner similar to Gigerenzer and Todd’s (1999) ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics in 
response to changes in perceptions and beliefs linked to social interaction. Critically, the ‘if, then’ 
logic of fast and frugal decision heuristics provides an explanation of the contextual 
responsiveness of identity threat impacting educational choices. Alternatively, broad based 
‘affective states’ influenced by emotions such as arousal are able to shape choice preferences in 
a similar way that a tide raises and lowers all ships (Loewenstein, 2005; Ariely & Loewenstein, 
2006). 
This is a major departure from the traditional economic approach to decision making where 
preferences are assumed to be innate and stable, and thereby exogenous. An explicit assumption 
that preferences are inherited and largely determined by biological processes. ‘‘..tastes neither 
change capriciously nor differ importantly between people’’ (Stigler & Becker, 1977). Indeed, 
the explanatory power of the standard economic model ‘‘lies in its ability to explain most patterns 
of economic behaviour without having to account for experience or perceptions’’ (McFadden, 
2001). In the standard economic model individuals collect information on alternatives, evaluate 
the probability of outcomes subject to (usually budget) constraints, and make a choice that 
reveals their preference. 
4 
However, if non-cognitive ability and personality traits shape economic choices in education 
and are themselves malleable (Kautz et al., 2014) then an economic understanding of preference 
endogeneity is needed. Specifically non-cognitive behaviour linked to achieving goals, investing 
effort and willingness to compete. Recently behavioural education economics has been subject 
 
Figure 26.1 The Choice Process. Dark lines represent rational choice processes. Light lines represent 
psychological processes. The dashed line indicates how perceptions and belief are able to 
shape preferences via motivations and attitudes 
Source: Modified from McFadden (2001). 
to an extensive literature review (Koch et al., 2014) and a review of interventions (Lavecchia & 
Oreopoulos, 2014). The focus of this chapter will be on the three key non-cognitive behaviours 
associated with choices in education that play a role in the endogeneity of preferences and lead 
to malleability of educational outcomes: self-control, self-efficacy and identity. 
Self-control: present bias, goals and commitment devices 
The relevance of self-control to understanding economic behaviour was first raised by Strotz 
(1955) as far back as the 1950s, noting that individuals regulate their future economic behaviour 
in a manner that may seem costly. The implication being that rational behaviour should lead to 
consistent choices of optimal future outcomes by reason alone and without the need for additional 
costly commitment devices. From an economic stand point, self-control allows individuals to 
avoid dynamic inconsistency in utility maximisation arising from preference reversals. In 
education, an example of time inconsistent preferences can be seen when a student procrastinates 
when studying and then subsequently regrets that choice (see Steel, 2007). Preference reversals 
occur in intertemporal choices when returns are discounted hyperbolically rather than 
exponentially (Ainslie, 1975; Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein & Perlec 1992). 
Self-control is the ‘‘effortful regulation of the self by the self ’’ (Duckworth, 2011) and is key 
to an individual maintaining educational investments over time. The ability of children to delay 
gratification has been shown to be a reliable predictor of future academic success. Human self-
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control begins at school age between three and six years old, and represents a crucial stage of 
differentiation of humans from our nearest relative the chimpanzee (Herrmann et al., 2014). 
Suggesting that self-control is a key cognitive development in our evolutionary development, 
forming a unique component of human decision making processes associated with learning. 
In Mischel et al.’s (1972) famous ‘marshmallow test’ four year olds were given a choice 
between eating a marshmallow (or similar treat) now or waiting and receiving an extra 
marshmallow at the end of the experiment.6 The marshmallow was placed on a table in front of 
the children and left unattended to maximise temptation. In this way self-control is seen as a 
finite resource which can be depleted. In a follow-up study a positive correlation was found 
between delayed gratification and SAT scores, with the correlations stronger for quantitative test 
scores than verbal test scores (Shoda et al., 1990). Importantly, studies have shown that self-
control is a better predictor of academic outcomes than IQ (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005). 
A New Zealand longitudinal study (Moffitt et al., 2011) of 1,000 individuals from birth to 32 
years of age showed that self-control was a predictor of health, substance dependence, earnings 
and criminal behaviour independent of cognitive ability and socio-economic background. A 
much larger UK longitudinal study (Daly et al. 2015) of two cohorts totalling 16,780 individuals 
found that low self-control measured in child aged seven and 11 years predicted unemployment 
in adulthood as far out as 50 years of age. However, the variation in probability of unemployment 
was strongest for individuals in their early 20s and declining over successive decades. 
Significantly, low self-control individuals experienced periods of unemployment 60 percent 
longer than experienced by high self-control individuals. An earlier study of 351 undergraduates 
by Tangney et al. (2004) similarly found a strong relationship between measures of self-control 
and higher academic results, better relationships, and less binge eating and alcohol abuse. The 
researchers suggest that self-control was important for conforming to social norms or 
alternatively self-control allows individuals to engage in activities that are social desirably and 
require the overriding of self-interest. 
It is important to note that self-control is also shaped by social interactions, particularly 
perceptions of trust. In a modified marshmallow experiment Kidd at al. (2013) added a preceding 
stage where perceptions of researcher reliability could be shaped. In this pre-stage, children were 
promised new crayons to draw with while they waited for the marshmallow experiment. One 
group received the new crayons as promised while the other group received old, clearly used 
crayons. Children who received the promised new crayons waited significantly longer than those 
who received the old crayons. Suggesting that self-control is strongly shaped by reasoned beliefs 
of the reliability of promises made by the researchers. Michaelson et al. (2013) found similar 
results for experiments with adults that showed social trust having a causal role in the willingness 
of individuals to delay immediate gratification. 
Goal setting is a way to frame the decision space as a smaller set of variables, thereby reducing 
the cognitive load of complexity (see Thaler 1985). Within these simpler decision spaces 
deliberate reasoned choices are more likely to avoid preference reversals. Importantly, when 
goals are framed as losses individuals are more likely to commit more effort to maintain choices 
in education. Aspirations framed as losses have been shown to lead to greater persistence by 
students in achieving their goals (Page et al., 2007). Morisano et al. (2010) showed that when 
university students asked to plan how to achieve their goals: ‘‘students who completed the goal 
setting ::: raised their grade point averages by 30 percent, and were much less likely to drop 
courses or quit university altogether.’’ Goals can also take the form of self-imposed deadlines. 
In a study involving university students, Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) found that students 
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participating in an incentivised proof-reading task who evenly spaced their deadlines performed 
significantly better than those that relied on a final deadline for submission of their work. 
Another way to overcome preference reversals is the use of self-imposed penalties as pre-
commitments. Bryan et al. (2010) ‘‘define a commitment device as an arrangement entered into 
by an agent who restricts his or her future choice set by making certain choices more expensive’’ 
and does not provide a strategic advantage with respect to others. For example, students may 
make binding commitments within groups that provide for penalties if shared individual goals 
are not achieved. These commitments devices can be very effective in maintaining school 
attendance and completion independent of any direct intervention by the school or authorities.7 
Self-efficiacy: cognitive biases and the role of incentives 
In any decision involving investments in education there needs to be a consideration of the 
expected return with respect to expected risk over time. Critically, this requires an assessment of 
an individual’s own or in the case of parents their child’s ability to achieve an optimal return on 
their investment in education. The greater the confidence an individual has in achieving a goal, 
the more resources they will invest. This perception of one’s own ability is called self-efficacy 
and the greater the belief in one’s self-efficacy the more productive the individual’s efforts (Eden, 
1988). However, the complexity of choices in education mean that perceptions are likely to be 
affected by cognitive biases leading to a problem Benabou and Tirole (2003) term imperfect self-
knowledge. 
In this regard, the general availability heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1973) play a key 
role in how individuals resolve information uncertainty and make inferences about their own 
ability and the perceived ability of others. There are considered to be three general purpose 
heuristics underlying many intuitive judgements under uncertainty: ‘availability’, 
‘representativeness’, and ‘anchoring with adjustment’ (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002). These intuitive 
heuristics are highly efficient decision rules that achieve a good outcome quickly and with little 
cognitive effort but at the expense of sizeable type 1 errors.8 For example in social groups, 
individuals are usually mindful of behaviours that lead to exclusion from a group. Misperceiving 
a behaviour as leading to ostracism is psychological costly, requiring effort, but is significantly 
less costly than missing cues that lead to ostracism (Williams, 2007). However, evolution always 
lags the environmental fitness space that individuals face and for humans our social interactions 
have grown in complexity in a relatively short space of evolutionary time. These biases are 
important for perceptions of group identity but also give rise to prejudice and stereotyping. 
Cognitive biases that favour false alarms over near misses to avoid social exclusion from tight 
knit groups in the past have now become a liability as social interactions expand. 
Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) were first to show how an anchoring and adjustment heuristic 
can affect the motivation of a student to perform and invest effort into their studies. A cognitive 
bias, the Pygmalion effect, where the greater the expectation placed upon a student the better 
they perform. In their experiments, teachers were given randomised reports on each student’s 
ability. They found that a teacher’s perceptions of a child’s ability had a marked impact on the 
child’s subsequent academic performance independent of the child’s actual initial ability. This 
cognitive bias is similar to the ‘hot hand’ effect in basketball (Gilovich et al., 1985) where 
misperceptions of luck as ability leads to reinforcing improved performance.9 
In a similar study by Cervone and Peake (1986), undergraduate and high school students were 
randomly exposed to anchors linked to perceptions of their own ability. Students exposed to a 
high anchor which indicated high ability persisted longer in tasks than students exposed to a low 
 7 
anchor. Suggesting that task performance is strongly shaped by judgements of self-efficacy 
independent of innate ability. Perceptions of self-efficacy also influence course choice at 
university. Hackett and Betz (1989) found that perceptions of self-efficacy were strongly related 
to choice of mathematics majors at university independent of underlying achievement and 
performance in mathematics. 
A solution to the problem of negative consequences of anchoring and framing is the use of 
incentives to reinforce positive outcomes. In the workplace the use of incentives is usually linked 
to a particular job description with defined outcomes rather than individual self-assessment and 
are thereby less impacted by misperceptions of self-capacity (Benabou & Tirole, 2005). 
However, the impact of asymmetric information ‘of the self by the self ’ on self-efficacy makes 
the use of incentives in education more complex and problematic than the traditional focus of 
incentives reinforcing productive behaviour in workplaces. 
Incentives as intrinsic rewards relate to how individuals attribute value to a task with respect 
to their own personal motivation. The concept of ‘meaning’ plays an important role in attributing 
value and can be shaped by the context of the task independent of an external reference. The best 
illustration of the behavioural dynamics behind the attribution of value through ‘meaning’ is the 
classic novel Tom Sawyer by Mark Twain. Tom Sawyer faced with having to whitewash a fence 
contrived to reposition the activity from being a chore to a rare opportunity which his friends not 
only find pleasure in doing but also paid to do so (Ariely et al. 2006). This example goes to the 
heart of economics and concept of scarcity. Scarcity is not necessarily an objective and fixed 
constant for all things. Scarcity can be shaped via perceptions of ‘meaning’ and consequently 
effect the extent to which an individual invests resources into an activity such as a learning task. 
Ariely et al. (2008) were able to show experimentally how ‘meaning’ could be manipulated 
to influence effort and persistence in tasks. They used a simple incentivised experiment where 
the context of a task, the assembly of Bionicle toys, was changed but the payoffs remained the 
same. In one context, students were able to line up their completed Bionicle as they went. In the 
other context a research assistant would disassemble the toy immediately in front of the student 
after it was assembled.10 Where Bionicles were disassembled in front of the students, persistence 
in tasks was significantly lower (7.2 units vs 10.6 units), required a higher marginal value for the 
last toy completed ($1.40 versus $1.01) and slower speed of construction (0.84/minute versus 
0.25/minute). 
Incentives as extrinsic rewards on the other hand frame choices with reference to externalised 
goals in order to overcome negative perceptions of self-efficacy. The impact of extrinsic rewards 
on academic performance has been shown to decline rapidly when delayed and that non-financial 
incentives are more cost effective with younger than older children (Levitt et al., 2012). 
Curiously, Levitt et al. found that framing rewards as losses did increase the effect of the 
incentives on student performance. In a study involving 250 schools, Fryer (2011) found that 
financial incentives tied to academic inputs, such as reading, had a positive impact on academic 
performance while incentives linked directly to outputs, such as test results, were less effective. 
Financial incentives also have little impact on increasing participation in education when the 
objective is to reduce the cost of the choice decision (for school vouchers see Ladd (2002), for 
school subsidies see Behrman et al. (2005)). Suggesting that financial incentives work best when 
reducing the complexity of the choice decision rather the costliness of a decision. In an 
experiment involving 300 students Springer et al. (2015) found that non-financial rewards in the 
form of certificates of recognition where more than five times more effective at boosting 
attendance compared to financial incentives relative to a control group (completion of allotted 
hours: 16.77 percent control, 25.09 percent financial incentives, 59.97 percent certificates). 
8 
Importantly while meaning and recognition trump financial incentives, meaning and recognition 
themselves are substitutes (Kosfeld et al., 2014). For a more extensive discussion of how context 
shapes the effectiveness of different types of incentives see Gneezy et al. (2011) and a review 
crowding out effects of financial rewards on intrinsic and social motivation see Deci et al. (1999). 
Identity: behaviour in groups and social interactions 
Choices in education by their very nature are dependent upon social interactions. These social 
interactions are complex and cognitively demanding due the number of variables involved, and 
problems of incomplete and asymmetric information. Consequently, ‘‘the ability to sort people 
(or objects) spontaneously and with minimum effort and awareness into meaningful categories 
is a universal facet of human perception essential for efficient functioning’’ (Bodenhausen, Todd 
and Becker 2006). A person’s identity defines who they are with regards to their social category, 
the ‘in-group’ (Akerlof and Kranton 2010). Having a common ‘identity’ in social interactions 
significantly reduces the amount of information asymmetry present with regards to individuals 
within the group, thereby decreasing the complexity of decision making. 
The same heuristics that are valuable in reducing complexity and cognitive load can also lead 
to bias-confirming assessments of inter-group relations giving rise to stereotyping. The 
perception of an individual’s identity status via social cues can reinforce confirmation biases 
associated with maintaining a state of identity threat (Darley & Gross, 1983). Identity threat is 
one of the mechanisms that lie behind persistent achievement gaps in education outcomes 
(females: Spencer et al., (1999); African-Americans: Steele and Aronson (1995); students from 
low socio-economic backgrounds: Croizet and Claire (1998)). However being a socially context 
dependent behaviour, identity is localised and does not persist beyond its context frame. For 
example, low achieving boys when changing grades experience large gains when leaving behind 
old identity norms and expectations (Dweck et al., 1978). For an explanation of the decision 
processes that underlie poor academic achievement due to identity threat (see Cohen & Garcia, 
2008). 
One of the clearest examples of the critical nature of context framing and the malleability of 
academic performance due to social identity is an experiment by Shih et al. (1999). In their study 
a group of Asian-American women were randomly split into two groups where either the 
individual’s gender or their ethnicity was made salient using semantic conditioning. Results were 
compared with a separate, randomly composed control group without any semantic conditioning. 
For the gender salient group individuals were asked to indicate their gender and answer gender 
related questions but excluding any reference to ethnicity. Questions for the ethnicity salient 
group were constructed in a similar manner while the control group answered questions without 
reference to either gender or ethnicity. Individuals in all groups then completed the same 
mathematics test. The researchers found that simply switching identity salience produced 
diametrically opposite levels of performance in the test. When identity was aligned with Asian 
ethnicity individuals achieved a higher level of accuracy than the control group (54 percent 
versus 49 percent). However, when identity was aligned with female gender individuals 
performed worse than the control group for exactly the same test (43 percent versus 49 percent). 
The important implication of this study is that individuals maintain multiple identities which can 
be triggered by social context leading to divergent performance in an academic environment. 
Social identity has also been shown to affect the willingness of individuals to compete and 
thereby participate in educational choices. The gender gap in mathematics has been shown by 
Gneezy et al. (2003), and more recently Niederle and Vesterlund (2010), to be influenced by a 
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screening effect where girls self-select out of mathematics subjects due the perceived 
competitiveness of the environment. A similar gender gap has been shown for competitive 
entrance exams in university choice ( Jurajda & Munich, 2011; Pekkarinen, 2014). In studies of 
girls attending co-educational and single-sex schools, the social context in which students make 
choices has been shown to change their risk preferences (Booth, Cardona-Sosa & Nolen, 2014). 
However, negative consequences of identity on academic performance can be remedied by either 
reducing the salience of a particular identity threat (Cohen & Garcia, 2005) or replacing 
conflicting identities with a new shared identity11 (West et al., 2009). 
 
Policy and future directions 
Behavioural economics seeks to identify the causal mechanisms linked to non-cognitive 
behaviour that underlie choices in education so as to inform effective education policy 
development. Increasingly policy focus is turning to how behaviours can be shaped in early 
childhood where the gains from policy interventions are greatest. While there is extensive 
experimental and longitudinal evidence of the substantial positive benefits linked to non-
cognitive skills and personality traits, little is known of the causal mechanisms involved and how 
they impact outcomes over the life of an individual (Heckman et al., 2012). In particular, a 
nuanced understanding that non-cognitive skills and personality traits that benefit academic 
outcomes may not necessarily be the same skills and traits that benefit future earnings in the 
workplace (Lee & Ohtake, 2014). 
There is now a substantial and well established literature covering the behavioural economics 
of public policy (Sharif 2012). However, most policy interventions in education take the form of 
either hard or light parentalism (see Lavecchia & Oreopoulos, 2014) which necessarily assumes 
that policy designers themselves are free of cognitive biases and the constraints of bounded 
rationality (Viscusi & Gayer, 2015). Light parentalism is most commonly recognised as ‘nudges’ 
(Sunstein & Thaler, 2012) where preferred choices are framed as defaults.12 While nudges are 
useful for policy design in areas such as health and savings, education is more challenging due 
to the complexity of social interactions that fall outside a formal regulatory framework. For 
education in particular, social interactions require a deeper understanding of how the macro-
behaviour of individuals in groups (see Schelling, 2006) impact on investments in education. 
Consideration also needs to be given to behavioural economics policies that increase choices 
in education rather than constraining choices by framing defaults. That behavioural economics 
can be used to increase choices in education is not new, although it may not have been recognised 
as such at the time. It can be considered that the introduction of Chapman’s (1988) income-
contingent loan scheme for financing higher education in Australia nearly 30 years ago was the 
first successful application of behavioural economics to education policy. The design of income-
contingent loans being effective in overcoming choice inertia, loss aversion, identity threat and 
willingness to compete which effect participation in higher education by students from low 
socioeconomic backgrounds and women. More consideration needs to be given to these types of 
‘reverse-nudges’ that increase both the availability of choice and the social benefits of these 
choices. 
Notes 
1 Unlike comparable large investments such as buying a home which are generally fungible and markets 
liquid. 
2 As suggested by Real Options theory. 
10 
3 Front loading is where most of the financial aid is available in the first year of study. 
4 A situation whereby the greater the expectation placed upon people, the better they perform.  
5 For an example of a discussion on the endogeneity of preferences see (Bowles, 1998). 
6 The marshmallow test is famous for the videos of children desperately trying to distract themselves from 
the temptation of eating the marshmallow in front of them. 
7 From a TV program discussing education and at-risk youth. Student: ‘‘Last year we made a bet - there 
were three of us - and whoever missed a day of school first had to pay the other one $100.’’ ‘‘It  pushed 
us to come to school and we did and everything improved.’’ http://www.sbs.com.au/news/insight/ 
tvepisode/shepparton-3630. 
8 Type 1 error is detecting an effect that is not present, while a type 2 error is failing to detect an effect 
that is present. 
9 At least until the ‘luck’ runs out and a ‘cold hand’ leads to reinforcing poor performance. 10 Which 
Ariely et al. called the Sisyphus condition. 
11 Such as replacing racial identities with a common university identity through activities such as sports 
teams. 
12 Light parentalism is sometimes called ‘libertarian parentalism’ while hard parentalism imposes 
mandatory choice outcomes. Parentalism being gender neutral as opposed to the widely used term 
‘paternalism’. 
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